SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF STRESS BEHAVIOR
In this presentation I would like to consider some general ideas about the nature of Stress and its relation to psychological functioning, particularly with regard to the alterations of cognition found in studies of laboratory, clinical and life stress. Important in this domain is an understanding of the conditions under which stress organizes and under which it disorganizes behavior. Lastly, I should like to raise some questions about the meaning of 'stress resistance 1 , frustration tolerance and cognate concepts which describe individual differences in persons'
capacities to function, at all or effectively, under stress.
The use> of the term "stress" in behavioral and biological sciences probably derives from the physical sciences, where usage has specified that stress is a force which is exerted on some system in such fashion as to deform, alter or damage the structure of that system, while the resulting deformation is described as strain. The stress-strain concepts are thus related in stimulus-response fashion. In our fields, there is no ready agreement on formal definition, but a common sense emerges as to the phenomena under consideration. There are statements which define stress in terms of stimulus properties; others in terms of particular responses; and other definitions in interactional terms. Perhaps the simplest way out of a definitional conflict is to assert that stress --as noun --describes an organismic state. Those events which provoke it are stress situations (or stimuli); the resulting behavioral alterations which occur are stress reactions. Moving the term stress from noun to adjective is consonant with the usage of Janis (1958) and Selye (1950 Selye ( , 1956 ).
In the stress state there is sufficiently potent danger (actual or anticipated) to the organism's well-being as to require extraordinary measures for the maintenance of organized functioning or, these failing, which may lead to behavioral disorganization, anxiety or other emotional tension. Obviously, there are many threats to well-being, differing in type, intensity, extensity locus and duration. Some have greater representation in consciousness, and consequently greater effects on behavior.
Vital danger to life itself can exist without conscious alarm, although physiological stress reactions may be evoked. Such, it is often noted, is the case in carbon monoxide poisoning. But suffocation through other causes leads immediately to anxiety, struggle and escape. Possibly conscious alarm reactions arose in evolution to signal on-coming danger in those cases where self-initiated actions could avoid its noxious effects.
It was to the great credit of Freud, in his later anxiety theory (Freud, 1936) , to recognize the dual function of anxiety in regulatory and pathological behavior. Obviously a symptom of disordered psychological functioning, anxiety serves as the signal of danger in the psychological realm leading to ^.-anticipatory and defensive actions designed to restore adaptive functioning and to obvert further, more intense anxiety. In its signal function, anxiety may lead to more directed and organized problemsolving behaviors as well as to ego-defensive maneuvers. This failing, either because the stress is too intense or long-standing, or because the coping mechanisms are inadequate to their onslaught, and greater anxiety appears as symptom of a disintegrative state in which the capacity for integrative actions are further reduced. In the psychoanalytic thesis (Fenichel, 19^5) , anxiety in its signal function is differentiated out of the original primitive emotional state as part of the general story of ego development. Obviously, to feel oneself threatened, there must he a sense of self and sufficiently developed cognitive mechanisms for differentiating not only self and not-self, but the objects of the environment as safe and unsafe. Memory of past dangers and anticipation of future are involved.
As anxiety intensifies, there tends to be regression of these ego mechanisms to more primitive forms. The continuity from originally diffuse emotional state to adaptive use of the painful affect, to pathological breakdown and resulting traumatic anxiety state is well described by Kurt Goldstein (e.g., Goldstein, 1951 )-In his view, fear (i.e., painful affect directed toward an object and capable of instigating adaptive behavior) is differentiated out of a more primitive emotional matrix. Ultimately, the object of fear is the catastrophic state in which capacity for organized behavior disappears and all that is left, so to speak, is the enveloping anxiety. There are of course many important differences in these theories; in their views of the locus and historical development of affects, the role of psychodynamic and unconscious factors, and the like. But I would like to note the common elements: first, the developmental continuum from primitive to focussed to disintegrative anxiety (in Fenichel's terms "trauma" to "danger" to "panic"); and, second, the relation between such an emotional continuum and more general dimension of behavioral organization-disorganization. Still, there might be some value in reconsidering the types of stress situations which have or might be studied, to see whether grouping in some more abstract categories might not reveal something more about the nature of the stress process.
1. Uncertainty. The ambiguous and vague situation, particularly if action is required and/or the organism is already highly motivated or anxious, is a powerful source of stress. Entrance into a novel situation, whether or not danger actually exists, has been described as an ubiquitous agent in the activation of the adrenocortical system (e.g., see review by Mason, 1959) . The importance of novelty as an generic stress suggests the concepts which have been put forth by workers within the Pavlovian tradition.
Thus, Liddell (1950) suggests that a prototype of anxiety might be the values. The potential failure of controls is therefore stress, for example, in the common instances of temptation. We made use of this in one of our studies to induce some anxiety for experimental study (Korchin, et al. 1958 ). Subjects were shown a picture tachistoscopically and asked to describe it as carefully as possible. Following this, he was again shown the same picutre (or so he thought) ostensibly to validate his original description. The picture, however, was changed, and in such a way as to impugn the subject's reality-testing by suggesting the instrusion of ordinarily-denied impulses. Thus, the first pair of pictures consisted of a man with a gun to his head, looking somewhat depressed; the "same" picture shown the second time had a pipe in place of the gun. In one study, it was found that this "ego-disintegrative threat" resulted in greater adrenocortical activation than did an induced failure in a quasi-intellectual i test, of the sort more commonly used in psychological stress experiments, though both situations functioned as stress. (Korchin & Herz, i960 ). The procedure developed by Asch for the study of independence and conformity is of a conceptually similar sort (Asch, 1952)• 5. Ego-mastery failure. In discussing personality functioning, the term "control" somehow suggests holding the line, while "mastery" connotes moving forward. Hence, even though these are distinctly overlapping concepts I would like to distinguish the more positive from the more negative aspects of the problem, as Robert W. White does in his important concept of "competence" motivation (White, 1959 ; I960)-Being blocked from mastering new goals, developing and exercising new talents, even though there is no danger to present control or need-satisfaction, can be an important source of stress. I am sure that Dr. Goldstein will develop this thesis at length, as he has in previous discussions of selfrealization.
6. Self-esteem danger. Though related to the points just made, the centrality of the self and the importance of the sentiment of selfesteem in the understanding of stress behavior should be emphasized. Situations which depreciate or lower the subject's feeling of worth have been used in experiemental studies; the term "ego-involved" to characterize some of these (as, e.g., in the work of Alper, 19^6; 19kQ) refers not only to the fact that the subject is highly motivated, but that success or failure is vital to his self-esteem. Thus far, I have considered some definitional problems and reviewed some of the general qualities of stress situations which seem important to the understanding of their effects on psychological functioning.
To continue this survey, I should like to comment now on those factors within the individual which affect resistance or receptivity to stress and finally to look at the effects of stress on psychological and physiological behaviors (stress reactions). As a map of the terrain, which might have some heuristic value, Figure 1 indicates the areas which seem relevant in the study of stress. A study was done at a large midwestern university to test the hypothesis that subjects in a hypnotic trance could be made to harm themselves. The subject was instructed to reach into a cage which visibly contained live rattlesnakes. Most subjects did so. Fortunately, they were protected by a sheet of "invisible" glass; the subject was not harmed, but the hypothesis was supported. But is this the only explanation? Does a sophomore at a state university, when he has voluntarily come to a professor's laboratory, really expect that he might be killed or even harmed? Is it not as likely that, in some sense, he "knew"
that there was no real danger, and that he could carry through the role of "cooperative subject" without any genuine fear of harm befalling him?
Another example arises in one of our experiments (Grinker, et al., 1957 )« Anxious patients were subjected to stressful interviews.
The interviews were designed to explore and confront the patient with potentially painful material of unresolved conflicts. At the same time, the interviewer adopted attitudes which might conflict with the particular patient's needs, and attempted also to distort the flow of communication as a further source of discomfort. For all this, the amount of anxiety aroused by this procedure was relatively small. Many subjects interpreted the meaning of this "stress situation" in terms of their conception of the hospital and their role in it. The hospital was a "benevolent ' place; the staff competent and sympathetic; it was a place for treatment and cure. Hence, this procedure might seem strange and perhaps somewhat annoying, but one could "believe that it was some therapeutic device intended for his good. Indeed, an occasional subject commented later on the value of having an emotional problem brought forcibly to his attention, which his therapist had approached so gingerly.
Another factor of the same order is the motivational state of the subject and his more enduring personality traits. The more highly motivated the subject and the more relevant the stress situation to the achievement or frustration of that motive, the more likely is stress to ensue. Similarly, stress effects are greater the more central the frustrated motive or threatened value; that is, the more the subject's identity and self-esteem depend on it. Mahl (19^9) studied gastric function in college students at the time of examinations and found some who showed little or none of the predicted changes. On closer investigation, these men turned out to be "gentlemen-C" students, for whom academic achievement was relatively unimportant. We found significant effects of induced failure in a test of "abstract intelligence" on later perceptual perfor-• mance, when the subjects were young, male psychiatric residents (Korchin, et al., 1951) . But in a later study, involving female social service students, the identical task had virtually no effect. In the self-concept (and, I believe, role-concept) of these girls, "abstract intelligence" did not figure prominently. If anyone was frustrated, it was the experimenteri It is easy but not necessary to multiply such examples. In Lazarus•* view of stress, the motivational construct is given a central position (e.g., Lazarus & Baker, 1956 ).
At the conceptual center of the chart (Figure 1 ) are those factors in the personality structure which describe vulnerability or susceptibility to stress, in general. Over and above issues concerned with the nature of the stress stimulus, or its relevance to the .subject's values or motives, terms like ego strength, stress resistance, frustration tolerance and the like call attention to qualities in the structure of personality which determine the threshold for stress arousal or the capacity of the individual to maintain organized functioning under stress.
Older, and perhaps unnecessarily rejected, terms like "strength of char- There is a long-standing bias in psychology to regard as more basic and perhaps more "real" that which can be measured physiologically. interviewed a group of young physicians and asked them to describe their characteristic symptoms in emotionally difficult situations. Later, the men were given a quite small dose of adrenalin. For some this roused anxiety and somatic symptoms, for others somatic experience without free anxiety, but in the great majority of cases the reported experiences were identical with those described as typical of past life stress. Thus, the "cold-feet" man,, got cold feet, and the "heart-palpitation" man developed heart palpitations. Though psychology textbooks dismiss the James-Lange theory, such findings should make us wonder whether there might not he some feedback loops worth reconsidering.
In a few minutes I would like to discuss some problems of stress and cognition in greater detail. However, I will bypass further consideration of the affective state in stress, except to note again the centrality of the problem of anxiety. Certainly, stress situations differ in the kinds of affect aroused, and these in turn may specify the types of psychological and physiological reactions observed. Thus, Ax, In our study of paratroopers in training (Basowitz, et al., 1955) ; w e found evidence that when the focal threat involved fear of failure there was more effective functioning and less extreme physiological reactions than when the focal threat involved concern with bodily, harm. We suggested that failure-anxiety (viewed as related to shame) is more likely to organize and facilitate behavior, while harm-anxiety (dynamically related to guilt) is more likely to lead to disorganization. Terms like "emotional arousal" mask the possibility of discovering more specific relatonships between the type of emotion and other aspects of behavior under stress.
The schema thus far discussed is entirely contemporaneous; it pictures the action of variables as of a conceptual moment in time.
For this presentation, the historical aspect, describing emergence of these personality structures and modes of stress response in the devel- Performance decrement is more likely to occur if the subject is operating at or close to his limit of performance, i.e., if the task requires all available skill, concentration of effort. Moreover, the more complex the task, the more it involves competing stimuli, the more stress-sensitive it is likely tobe. The acquisition of new learning is more difficult than the practice of older. Operating against established habits is difficult. For example, inadequate performance on a mirror-tracing task has been described as pathognomic of anxiety by Wechsler and Hartogs (19^5)-Tasks requiring a narrow focussing of attention (e.g., digit-span) or wide ranging attention (as in incidental learning) suffer.
Recently, I have suggested that some unity might be given the diverse findings on the effects of stress on cognitive organization and psychological performance by viewing the problem in terms of the alteration of the attentional field (Korchin, 1962) . Prior to the more extreme levels of breakdown, there is a narrowing of the attentional field -- Tolman (19^8) once noted that cognitive maps are narrowed in states of intense emotion.
This reduces the flexibility of performance, but whether it facilitates or disturbs performance depends on the nature of the task. For example, it is predictable that where behavior involves "doing two things at once," where there are focal and peripheral functions being assessed simultaneously, there will be relatively more decrement measurable in the peripheral than focal tasks. Vigilance experiements involving a broad field and studies of incidental learning support such a view. Recently, Easterbrook (1959) has proposed a similar interpretation phrased in terms of a reduction in the "range of cues utilized" under emotional arousal.
Before concluding, I should like to add a final comment about stress resistance in general, mainly to raise an issue for discussion. By suggested the term "psychiatric plimsoll mark" to characterize individual differences in stress tolerance, drawing for analogy on the mark made on the side of a ship to indicate the point to which it could safely be loaded and still withstand the rigors of storm and high sea. This is an expressive phrase, though our earlier analysis would suggest that each of us has many rather than one such mark. However, what is implied in the phrase, and many others like it, is that each man has his "breaking point;" some at a lower and some at a higher level of stress. Corollary to this are the added implications that more stress resistance is better than less, and that having high stress tolerance is part of the general state of personality adequacy. Psychiatrically-i11 is often made synonymous with stresssensitive; mentally-höalthy with stress-tolerant. Surely, these are acceptable generalizations and we use them commonly in lay and professional discussions but we should note some unwonted implications.
In opening another conference on stress, Sir Geoffrey Vickers (i960) quoted Field-Marshal Lord Wavel1 as saying that one should not be surprised at discovering stupidity in generals, for they are selected from the extremely small group of humans who are tough enough to be generals at all. Neither cleverness nor sensitivity are parts of their essential qualifications, but rather that they should be able to function, even if poorly, in situations in which cleverer and more sensitive men would have ceased functioning altogether. Stress resistance may be bought at the cost of other desirable qualities.
The intellectually-dull, the unmotivated, the uninvested to be able to stand frustration better than the more clever and committed wan.
Stress resistance may result from an insensitivity to the range of experience, which misses potential threat along with other aspects of the world.
It is interesting that the word sensitivity carries both good and bad connotations. On the one hand it suggests finer discrimination and fuller understanding, and on the other hand greater readiness to feel personal hurt, which is perhaps a cost of being more discriminating. I would be hesitant to predict whether the more creative person should be more or less stress resistant.
